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REIGNING IN A ROGUE: ACHIEVING AND DRAFTING A NORTH
KOREAN NUCLEAR DEAL
JAMES K. WILLIAMS *
The path to an effective nuclear deal with North Korea is narrow. Yet a deal is
possible, and could potentially benefit the United States. North Korea’s nuclear program
poses a major global security threat. That a rogue, albeit not irrational, regime presides
over an increasingly sophisticated nuclear arsenal 1 is especially problematic for the
United States and its allies across the world. 2
It would be difficult to form an effective nuclear deal with North Korea because
the existence of a strong nuclear program helps the Kim regime maintain its power and
control over the North Korean people. 3 North Korea’s strong nuclear program also makes
dealing with the country sufficiently unpredictable, which ironically enhances North
Korean security. 4 While typically nuclear arsenal development signals economic
strength, North Korea’s economy has been decimated by sanctions imposed by the

*

James K. Williams is a 2016 graduate of Georgetown University Law Center and an Associate at
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP.

1

North Korea's nuclear programme: How advanced is it?, BRIT. BROAD. CO. (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699.

2

See, e.g. Javier E. David, North Korea’s arsenal raises the stakes for US grid security: Experts, CNBC
(Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/20/north-koreas-arsenal-raises-the-stakes-for-us-gridsecurity-experts.html.
3

See Kyle Mizokami, Welcome to North Korean Nuclear Weapons 101, NAT’L INTEREST (Sept. 26, 2015),
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/welcome-north-korean-nuclear-weapons-101-13940?page=2.
4

Id.

Williams 1

United States and others. 5 As a result of North Korea’s recent nuclear tests and other
hostile actions, the United States and the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”)
recently imposed harsh new sanctions on Pyongyang. 6 These new sanctions, in addition
to South Korea’s suspension of the Kaesong Industrial Project, 7 have dealt North Korea’s
economy a significant blow. 8 Most recently, Kim Jong Un expressed a willingness to
normalize relations with “hostile” states during the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea’s
Seventh Party Congress. 9 This expressed interest, along with the grim economic situation
in North Korea, signals the possibility of engagement. 10 The most beneficial engagement
for disarmament purposes, however, can only occur if the United States first seeks to
weaken the increased leverage North Korea has gained from its recent nuclear tests. 11
The United States should continue to exert pressure on North Korea by enforcing strong
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economic sanctions against the Kim regime and third parties who assist with its human
rights abuses, trying to secure China’s support, and strengthening its military capability in
South Korea without encroaching on North Korea’s sovereignty. 12 These strategies will
probably give the United States its best shot at bringing North Korea to the negotiating
table. 13
An effective North Korean nuclear deal must be carefully structured. This paper
proposes potential language that might realistically be included in such a deal. Unlike the
recent Iran nuclear agreement, an agreement with North Korea should be structured as a
formal treaty rather than as a political agreement and would have to include strong
nuclear cessation provisions in its operative text rather than solely within its preamble. It
could also be used to address other issues with North Korea, such as the Kim regime’s
human rights abuses and the country’s market structure.
Even with uncertain language, a North Korean nuclear deal would provide a
number of important benefits. First, it would help halt regional nuclear proliferation and
increase global security. Second, it would also diminish the nuclear threat to the United
States and result in a beneficial economic impact for North Korea and those who are
currently prohibited from trading with it due to the existing sanctions framework. Third, a
nuclear deal with North Korea would benefit the United States by providing extensive
information regarding North Korea’s secretive nuclear program.
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Kim Jong Un noted in a recent speech that North Korea would not use its nuclear weapons in a
preemptive strike unless necessary to defend its sovereignty. Id.
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Interview with Bruce Klingner, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation, in D.C. (Apr. 7, 2016).
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The first part of this paper describes the global security threat posed by North
Korea’s nuclear program, focusing on the Kim regime’s use of the program to maintain
support and increase North Korea’s security. It will also describe the program’s rapid
development and how this poses a global security threat. Next, the paper will discuss past
attempts at forming a nuclear deal with Pyongyang and how the United States can exert
pressure on North Korea, given its current situation, to force them to the bargaining table.
Third, the paper will provide potential language and clauses that should be included in a
North Korean nuclear deal and will discuss why they are both important and realistic.
Fourth, the paper will discuss the benefits of a potential nuclear deal for the United
States. The paper will conclude by discussing how strict verification measures, hard
power, continued diplomacy, and economic penalties for cheating are essential to
securing an agreement’s long-term ability to protect global security.
1. North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal Poses a Major Global Security Problem
North Korea’s nuclear arsenal poses a major concern for the United States, its
allies, and a number of other countries in Asia. 14 Although North Korean leadership has a
history of making escalating threats whenever the United States or any other major
developed nations focus their attention on its nuclear program, many believe these threats
to be more bark than bite. 15 Some believe that they are primarily designed to capture and
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divert the attention of the United States and other developed countries. 16 If this is North
Korea’s goal, the threats have proven incredibly effective, as the United States has spent
considerable energy and manpower attempting to hedge against them. 17 This is mainly
because there is no way to be sure that North Korea and its rogue regime are not
preparing to launch a preemptive nuclear attack against the United States, South Korea,
or another country given the paucity of intelligence we have relating to North Korea’s
nuclear program. 18 It would be irresponsible to ignore such persistent threats coming
from a rogue regime that is in possession of a rapidly developing nuclear arsenal. 19
a. North Korean Leadership: a Rogue Regime
North Korea is controlled by a rogue but rational regime headed by Kim Jong Un.
To understand North Korea’s regime and how it operates, you have to understand how
the Kim dynasty came to power and currently maintains its control over the country. The
Kim dynasty is a three-generation lineage of North Korean leadership descending from
the country’s first leader, Kim Il Sung. 20 Kim Il Sung came into power after the Japanese
surrendered their occupation of Korea in 1945. 21 The Soviet Union persuaded him to
assume the leadership of the Soviet-occupied northern half of Korea, while the southern
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half of Korea was supported by the United States. 22 Kim’s rule was backed by Soviet
occupation from 1945 until 1948. 23 After the Soviet forces left North Korea, Kim
launched the Korean War in 1950 in an attempt to reunify North and South Korea by
force. 24 Ultimately, his attempt failed due to efforts by troops from the United States and
United Nations. Kim narrowly maintained his power in the north after the Chinese
intervened to stave off an invasion by UN forces. 25 Ultimately, the Korean War ended in
a stalemate in 1953. 26 Kim’s leadership during that war helped him establish legitimacy,
a cult following, and god-like persona among North Koreans. 27 This status, along with
extensive propaganda, the brutal use of force, and the granting of major rewards to others
with power, has allowed the Kim family to maintain a hereditary dynasty. 28
The story told to North Korean school children is far less realistic. “Koreans are
taught that by the age of 14 Kim Il Sung had founded an ‘anti imperialism league’ and at
19, he had invented the country’s Juche ideology and was leading a Korean rebel army
equipped with tanks. They are told that this force defeated the Japanese and drove them
out of Korea, although in fact the Japanese Kwantung Army did not suffer any military
defeats in either Manchuria or Korea. In this imagined history, the role of the Americans,
the Soviets, the atomic bombs, the Chinese Communist and Nationalist Parties, and
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virtually every other historical fact vanishes from the record.” 29 The Kim dynasty derives
its legitimacy from the propaganda it promulgates. 30 In fact, Kim Il Sung led a campaign
to “purge” those privy to his actual background from the North Korean government. In an
effort to further the Kim dynasty’s deification, the North Korean government effectively
exiled two hundred thousand Christians and destroyed more than 2,400 temples,
churches, and Buddhist shrines. 31 All remaining Christians were persecuted, and by 1962
Kim claimed to have executed all Protestant and Catholic priests and sent all religious
figures to hard labor camps. 32 At the same time, Kim “investigated” more than 600,000
of his supporters and punished 450,000 who violated his rules. 33 All of this was designed
to establish the Kim regime as the ultimate power in North Korea and develop a god-like
following for Kim among North Korean citizens, such that they would not question or
restrict his leadership. 34
As a result of the Kim regime’s propaganda and efforts to stifle dissent, there are
few internal North Korean threats to the Kim dynasty. Therefore, even if some citizens
are wary of spending roughly 25% of North Korea’s GDP on its nuclear program 35 or
deliberately provoking the United States, resulting in harsh rounds of sanctions, there is
little they can do to change the country’s direction. Perhaps more importantly, the Kim
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David Francis, How North Korea Starved Its People for a Nuke, FISCAL TIMES (Apr. 9, 2013),
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regime’s elaborate network of informants working for multiple internal security agencies
and its brutal use of force assures that dissenters do not speak out against it. 36 Those
accused of minor offenses against the Kim dynasty must undergo “reeducation.” 37 More
serious offenses usually result in the perpetrator being executed or placed in a political
prison camp. 38 Even if a dissenter accepts one of these punishments, North Korea’s threegenerations policy assures that their entire family is ultimately punished, effectively
stifling any and all dissent. 39
While ordinary citizens suffer, military and political elites generally receive
rewards in the form of better and more plentiful food, lodging, and the most desirable
jobs. 40 This has insulated North Korean political elites from famines and given them
some say over the country’s policies. 41 Some also see the country’s extensive military
spending, erratic foreign affairs policies and propaganda, and nuclear weapons programs
as tools to assure military loyalty, as they grant the military prestige and international
attention that it would not otherwise have. 42 These benefits help prevent a military coup,
which has become a potential threat in recent years. 43 This is especially important given
how much power the military wields within the country and in global affairs due to the
country’s erratic foreign policy.
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b. The Kim Regime: Rogue, but Rational
Although the North Korean regime is rogue, it is not irrational. 44 The Kim regime
uses its unpredictability to rile up South Korea, Japan, and the United States while
keeping the country secure. 45 As a result of this unpredictability, top United States
intelligence officials are not confident that Kim will not make an unprovoked nuclear
strike against the United States. 46 In other words, the Kim regime’s seemingly irrational
approach to foreign policy is rationally designed to protect North Korean sovereignty.
The Kim regime often takes unpredictable and seemingly irrational action. For
example, North Korea shut down the Kaesong industrial park in 2013 to strike a blow to
South Korea. 47 While most of the companies in this park are South Korean companies,
more than 55,000 of their workers are from North Korea. 48 The North Korean
government used to take between 45% and 70% of the wages these workers earned for its
military and nuclear program, which is an important source of hard cash amid a myriad of
strict economic and nuclear sanctions. 49 As a result of its action to pull workers out of the
industrial park, North Korea shut off its best source of foreign currency, which is
necessary for it to advance its nuclear program. 50 While South Korea suffered losses as

44
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See supra note 13.
See supra note 13.
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Matt Smith, US lawmaker questions North Korean leader’s ‘stability’, CNN (Mar. 17, 2013),
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well, it seems at least somewhat irrational for North Korea to hurt itself and its workers to
strike a relatively minimal blow to South Korea. Also, North Korea sought to reengage in
six party talks after backing out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (the “NPT”). 51
North Korea accepted an agreement initially, but ultimately backed out of it after the
United Nations (the “UN”) condemned North Korea’s failed attempt to launch a
satellite. 52 North Korean leaders probably knew that the satellite would ultimately fail to
enter orbit but allowed the launch to go forward anyway, to draw international media
attention. 53 International experts have struggled to explain why North Korea would
intentionally conduct a satellite launch that was destined to fail when it knew that doing
so would jeopardize its agreement. 54 The North Korean government deciding to
undertake such actions makes little sense and demonstrates a pattern of unpredictability
and irrationality.
Despite its unpredictable actions, North Korea’s nuclear program exists for a
relatively predictable purpose. The existence of a strong military and nuclear program
helps keep North Korean citizens loyal to the Kim regime by uniting the country against
two perceived enemies: the United States and South Korea. 55 The Kim regime has long
argued that it alone maintains the real spirit of the Korean people while South Korea is an

course, South Korean firms that utilized cheap North Korean labor also suffered substantial losses as a
result of the project’s closure.
51

See Hanssen, supra note 50.

52

Morgan Potts, Is North Korea a Rational Actor? The Wrong and Right Questions to Ask, SINO NK (Dec.
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illegitimate Korean country because it is a puppet of the United States. 56 North Korean
propaganda often paints the United States as being the antithesis of the Korean spirit and
a threat to the Korean way of life. 57 As discussed below, North Korea’s nuclear weapons
program is touted as being the best way to stop a United States invasion. To the people of
North Korea, this nuclear defense and the Kim regime are the only things standing
between the Korean way of life effectively becoming influenced by the American way of
life. Without a nuclear program, North Koreans may see the Korean way of life being
threatened and call for a change in leadership. 58
The Kim regime’s unpredictability coupled with its nuclear program and strong
conventional military force undoubtedly helps prevent preemptive foreign military
action. 59 Pyongyang used to view chemical weapons as sufficient to deter against foreign
invasion by the United States and others. 60 However, after watching the United States
soundly defeat the Iraqi military during the Persian Gulf War, which was built and
outfitted similarly to the Korean People’s Army, North Korea realized that it needed
more than a conventional military force to protect itself. 61 The country jumpstarted its
nuclear weapons program. 62 This view was largely vindicated when President George W.

56

Id.

57

Id.
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This mentality has obvious implications for a nuclear deal that are discussed further supra. If North
Korean’s are wary of giving up the Korean way of life and view the country’s nuclear program as the best
means of protecting their way of life, it would seem that a nuclear deal would hinge on either total North
Korean regime change or the Kim regime’s ability to convince the people that not having a nuclear
program would do more to protect their way of life than maintaining such a program.
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(2015), http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/NKNF-NK-Nuclear-Futures-Wit-0215.pdf.
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Bush labeled North Korea, along with Iran and Iraq, as part of the “axis of evil” but chose
only to invade Iraq. 63 While Iran started scrambling to develop a fledgling nuclear
program, North Korea had already insulated itself against foreign action and there was
little the United Nations Security Council could do to prevent the regime from continuing
its nuclear activities. 64 While developing its new nuclear program, Iran was forced to
come to the negotiating table with the United States, giving up its isolationist strategy to
deter against action by the United States. 65 North Korea was able to maintain a
completely isolationist policy despite rounds of new sanctions levied against it. 66 As
evidenced by the Kim regime’s ability to maintain control and defend its sovereignty, its
seemingly erratic and isolationist foreign policy has actually been quite rationally
designed to advance the regime’s security. North Korea’s growing nuclear program will
do so even more effectively.
c. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program is Developing Quickly
Given the paucity of intelligence on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, it is
unclear just how advanced it really is. 67 Based on the available intelligence, North Korea
is thought to have a between ten and sixteen crude atomic bombs at present, 68 although
its recent test of a hydrogen bomb may indicate that it has achieved a more complex

63

Glenn Kessler & Peter Baker, Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ Comes Back to Haunt United States, WASH. POST
(Oct. 10, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/10/09/AR2006100901130.html.
64
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Peter Harris, North Korea: The Axis of Evil’s Last Man Standing, NAT’L INTEREST (Jan. 5, 2015),
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-korea-the-axis-evil’s-last-man-standing-11958.
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North Korean leader: Prep nukes for use at moment’s notice, CBS NEWS (Mar. 3, 2016),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/report-north-korea-readying-nuclear-weapons/.

68
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boosted fission weapon. 69 However, many analysts have questioned whether the weapon
tested was actually a hydrogen bomb and, even if it was, whether it was successful. 70
Most evidence points to this being an extremely crude attempt at developing a hydrogen
bomb, but it also indicates that North Korea desires to and will eventually be able to
achieve hydrogen capability. 71 This threat looks certain to continue growing in coming
years. 72 It is estimated that Pyongyang could potentially develop as many as fifty to one
hundred bombs within the next four years. 73 Although this number seems somewhat
unrealistic, it is indicative of North Korea’s goal of drastically expanding its nuclear
arsenal. 74
Given North Korea’s new, advanced weapon and its ongoing development of several
different missile systems, the country increasingly poses a direct threat to the United
States and its regional allies in Asia. 75 North Korea appears to have developed both
medium and long-range ballistic missiles (“MRBM” and “LRBM”, respectively) and
miniaturization capabilities that allow them to place some of their nuclear bombs on
those missiles. 76 Some analysts speculate that the country has developed intercontinental
ballistic missiles (“ICBM”) because it has allegedly sold those types of missiles to
69

Anna Fifield, North Korea Hints It Has a Hydrogen Bomb, But Skepticism Abounds, NAT’L INTEREST
(Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-says-its-ready-to-detonate-h-bombbut-skepticism-abounds/2015/12/10/fe69922e-17ef-4020-8342-1b07fde0a55b_story.html.
70
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countries in the Middle East, including some that do not currently have nuclear
programs. 77 If true, this would allow North Korea to reach the continental United States
with a nuclear enabled missile. 78 Even if it is untrue, North Korea is developing and
testing submarine launched ballistic missile (“SLBM”) capabilities and recently
conducted what appears to be a successful SLBM test. 79 Given the threat posed by this
rapidly developing nuclear program, a North Korean nuclear agreement containing strict
disarmament and verification provisions would be a significant boon for the United States
and its allies.
d. North Korea Has a Large Traditional Military
Given North Korea’s large and well-positioned conventional military, a
preemptive strike against the country would be difficult, deadly, and costly. South Korea
has largely been hostile to this idea, but the United States considered it prior to North
Korea’s development of a strong nuclear program. 80 While North Korea’s conventional
arms are largely antiquated, sometimes dating back half a century or more, what the
country lacks in modernity it makes up for in volume and location. 81 North Korea has
about 18,000 heavy artillery pieces near its border with South Korea and can reach Seoul,

77

See supra note 13.

78

See supra note 75.

79

John Schilling, A New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile for North Korea, 38 NORTH (Apr. 25,
2016), http://38north.org/2016/04/jschilling042516/.

80

Robert Kelly, The Ultimate Nightmare: Why Invading North Korea Is a Really Bad Idea, NAT’L
INTEREST (Apr. 10, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-ultimate-nightmare-why-invadingthe-north-korea-really-12157.
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the capital of South Korea, within 60 seconds with artillery fire. 82 In addition to this
artillery, the North has 63 submarines, which it has used in the past to sink South Korean
ships. 83 It also has more than 625 boats of different varieties, each designed to either fight
or aid in combat. 84 In addition to these forces, North Korea has a relatively sizeable air
force and army, each capable of inflicting a large amount of damage on anyone
attempting to attack the country. 85
While some have argued that North Korea’s military is largely a paper tiger, there
are strong reasons to suspect that it would fight against any invasion attempt backed by
the United States. An invasion by the United States or another similar foreign power
would likely trigger a strong military response because it would justify the propaganda
North Korean soldiers have heard for decades. 86 Likewise, North Koreans would view an
invasion as an attempt to end North Korean sovereignty, and would likely use the full
weight of their force against such an invasion. 87 Indeed, the Kim regime has long
maintained that any invasion or attack against North Korea would be met with the full
weight of the country’s military forces, including the potential use of chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons. 88 The potential disaster that would ensue if these
weapons were to be used would be incredibly brutal and costly, which makes diplomacy
the more attractive approach when dealing with North Korea.
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83
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2. A Nuclear Deal with North Korea Would be Difficult, but Possible
There are many reasons to doubt North Korea’s willingness to strike a deal that
curtails their nuclear program or allows United Nations (“UN”) or outside access to the
program for verification purposes. There are also reasons to think that North Korea would
be willing to engage in talks that may lead to nuclear disarmament or a nuclear pause.
It should be noted that there is a big difference between merely striking a nuclear deal
and striking a deal that includes strong disarmament and verification provisions. It will be
even more challenging for the United States to strike a deal that effectively binds North
Korea for the long term, as North Korea has backed out of many prior agreements that
seemed promising when they were signed.
a. Previous Attempts to Strike a Nuclear Deal with North Korea have
Failed, but There are Promising Signs that a Deal is Possible
Previous nuclear deals with North Korea have fallen apart. In one particularly
poignant example, North Korea was suspected of cheating on its nonproliferation
obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 89 (“NPT”)
between 1992 and 1993. 90 The International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) conducted
six inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities, but North Korea refused entry to two
of its suspected nuclear waste sites. After the IAEA went to the UNSC to request special
ad-hoc investigations of all North Korean nuclear facilities, North Korea announced its

89

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483.

90

Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy, ARMS CONTROL ASSOC. (Mar. 2016),
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron.
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intent to withdraw from the NPT on March 12, 1993. 91 However, it ultimately suspended
its announced withdrawal and used the threat of potential NPT withdrawal in subsequent
sanctions negotiations with the United States. 92 This produced the Agreed Framework, an
agreement between the United States and North Korea under which North Korea pledged
to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for energy aid, including two light-water
reactors. 93 Ultimately, the Agreed Framework collapsed in October 2002 when the
United States confronted North Korea with evidence of a secret uranium enrichment
program. 94 Shortly after, North Korea wound up withdrawing from the NPT on January
10, 2003. 95
The six-party talks provide yet another example of a failed attempt at a nuclear deal
with North Korea. These talks were a series of multilateral negotiations between China,
Japan, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, and the United States that occurred irregularly
starting in 2003. 96 The First Round of talks started on August 27, 2003, but ultimately
ended with no agreement because the United States and North Korea were at odds over a
non-aggression pact. 97 The talks were also marred when North Korea announced that it
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would test a nuclear weapon in order to prove that it had attained the ability to do so. 98
The Second Round of talks, which started on February 25, 2004, were much more
promising. 99 North Korea announced that it was willing to destroy its nuclear weapons
program if it were allowed to maintain its peaceful nuclear activities. 100 The United
States balked at this deal, believing that North Korea would use its peaceful nuclear
facilities as a front to develop its nuclear weapons program. 101 The Third Round, held in
June of 2004, proved no more fruitful, as North Korea announced that it would only
destroy its nuclear weapons in exchange for compensation, which the United States was
unwilling to agree to. 102 The Fourth Round, held in September of 2005, was precluded by
North Korean claims that the United States planned to overthrow its government. 103
Despite the rough start, these talks produced a joint statement on agreed steps toward
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. 104 North Korea agreed to abandon all nuclear
weapons, return to the NPT, and accept IAEA inspections. 105 In return, the other parties
agreed to do three things: (1) recognize North Korea’s right to maintain a peaceful
nuclear program, (2) provide North Korea with energy aid, and (3) consider providing
North Korea with a light water reactor at some time in the future. 106 The United States
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and South Korea also agreed not to deploy nuclear weapons on the peninsula. 107 After
striking this agreement and before the Fifth Round, North Korea conducted a number of
missile tests and its first nuclear test in response to sanctions imposed on North Korean
trading entities and Banco Delta Asia by the United States. 108 Ultimately, the Fifth Round
was held in February of 2007 and resulted in initial steps to implement the agreement
struck during the Fourth Round. 109 In the Sixth Round of negotiations, held in March of
2007, North Korean negotiators walked out over the delayed release of North Korean
funds held in Banco Delta Asia. 110 Although some steps were taken, delays in
implementing the agreement struck during the Fourth Round and difficulty in agreeing on
a verification system ultimately plagued implementation of the agreement. 111 After the
UNSC implemented sanctions on North Korean firms in response to the testing of a
Taepo Dong-2 rocket, the Kim regime announced that it would not participate in future
six-party talks and conducted a second nuclear test in short order. 112
Although these talks ultimately faltered, it is notable that Pyongyang used them as a
launching point for two nuclear cessation agreements. 113 In one instance Kim Jong Il
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allowed foreign inspectors to inspect Kumchang-ri in exchange for food aid. 114 In the
other, Kim Jong Un froze the country’s nuclear program in exchange for similar
humanitarian aid. 115 These concessions, along with North Korea’s willingness to agree to
destroy its nuclear program in exchange for energy aid during the Fourth Round of the
six party talks, indicate that a deal is possible. However, these talks also show that any
deal struck between the United States and North Korea must include incentives to prevent
North Korea from backing away from the agreement and cannot provide frontloaded
sanctions relief and aid. Effective verification procedures are also essential, as North
Korea appears to have become especially adept at developing its nuclear program in
secret. 116
Most recently, in 2015 North Korea reached out to United States officials through the
UN to propose formal peace talks on ending the Korean War. 117 This effort was a
response to President Barack Obama’s remarks that the United States would be willing to
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engage Pyongyang. 118 The United States was hopeful that it could extract nuclear
concessions from North Korea during this process. 119 However, negotiations stalled as
North Korea refused to include provisions restricting its nuclear program in any
agreement even though they had recently tested a nuclear weapon. 120 The United States
has long required that North Korea take steps toward denuclearization prior to the
initiation of any formal peace talks, so its willingness to engage in peace talks without
this precondition signified a policy pivot toward engagement. 121 However, the United
States became unwilling to negotiate with North Korea, which it saw as seeking “to
bargain, to trade or ask for a pay-off in return for abiding by international law.” 122 North
Korea’s decision to not include nuclear cessation or disarmament provisions as part of the
negotiations despite the United States’ lowered negotiation threshold seems to indicate its
general unwillingness to agree to any restrictions on its nuclear efforts. However, in
recent days the regime has indicated a willingness to normalize relations with “hostile
regimes.” 123 Whether this is true remains to be seen, but it is a positive sign when
considered in combination with North Korea’s willingness to reach out to the United
States of its own accord after the Obama administration’s policy shift.
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b. A Three-Pronged Policy Approach May Draw North Korea to the
Bargaining Table
Although this background may seem bleak, North Korea’s current situation combined
with a three-pronged policy approach from the United States could draw the country to
the bargaining table willing and ready to make a deal with significant disarmament
provisions. First, the United States should fully enforce targeted economic sanctions
against North Korea. President Obama issued Executive Order 13722 on March 16, 2016,
which imposed additional sanctions on North Korea and third parties who assist North
Korean violators with human rights abuses, human trafficking, cyberattacks, and
censorship. 124 Unfortunately, the executive order’s accompanying list of violators was
minimal and failed to include any North Korean entities involved in human rights, cyber,
or censorship violations. 125 No third parties were sanctioned. 126 Since the United States
has the good fortune of being able to sanction almost any financial entity because most
financial transactions must be cleared through New York, 127 the lack of third party
violators from the sanctions list seems especially remarkable. 128 This sanctions authority
should be used to seize North Korean assets, fine third party banks doing business with
North Korea, and block those entities from accessing the United States’ financial
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system. 129 Similar sanctions on Banco Delta Asia had a significant effect on North
Korea’s ability to access foreign currency and cast a pall over other entities engaged in
business with the Kim regime. 130 Doing this will undoubtedly make it more difficult for
the Kim regime to support military elites and continue to fund its nuclear program. It will
also have the added effect of diminishing the number of major foreign financial and
corporate entities who are willing to do business with North Korea. This should make it
increasingly difficult for North Korea to obtain enough foreign currency to sustain its
nuclear operation. 131
Second, the United States should engage with China to attempt to gain support for a
nuclear deal with North Korea. At the same time, the United States should alert China to
its intention to enforce enhanced sanctions against third parties, and should point out that
it plans to name and shame violators as a part of enforcing these sanctions laws. China is
unlikely to be pleased with this strategy. North Korea trades almost exclusively with
China and the Kim regime has generally received at worst lukewarm support from China.
Therefore, it will probably be difficult to convince China that a nuclear deal, which may
destabilize the Kim regime, is in its best interests. However, given North Korea’s erratic
foreign policy and that the United States will likely have to maintain a strong military
presence in South Korea so long as the threat of nuclear weapons remains, China might
be convinced to push North Korea toward a nuclear deal. It would be in their best
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interests to see the United States diminish its long-term military presence in South
Korea. 132 Likewise, since most of North Korea’s export partners are Chinese entities,
some of these entities will inevitably become wrapped up in any push for stronger
sanctions against third parties who assist North Korea. So long as no enormous, wellregarded Chinese entities are among these violators, this issue can probably be overcome
if the United States stresses that it is merely enforcing its domestic laws. The imposition
of sanctions against smaller Chinese entities is unlikely to greatly worsen relations with
China. 133 Obtaining China’s support for increased sanctions and an initial increased
military presence in South Korea is essential to obtaining a strong nuclear agreement with
North Korea. 134 Given that China is North Korea’s primary export market, preventing
Chinese entities from trading with North Korea is also essential to weakening the Kim
regime and the North Korean economy enough to draw it to a nuclear bargaining table.
Third, the United States should enhance its military presence and capability in Asia
until nuclear negotiations are underway. This should primarily include placing missile
defense systems in South Korea. 135 It should also develop plans with South Korea to
launch air strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities, missiles, command and control
centers, and senior leaders should war break out between the two countries. Some of
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these actions are already in progress. 136 Even if this capability is never exercised, it will
provide the hard power necessary to counterbalance North Korea’s military might, most
of which is stationed right outside the demilitarized zone.
It should be noted that, even if the United States succeeds at getting North Korea to
the negotiating table, all past attempts to establish long-term restrictions on North
Korea’s nuclear program have ultimately failed. 137 The country restarted its nuclear
program and banished inspectors within twelve months of striking previous small-scale
nuclear deals. 138 Therefore, any nuclear deal with North Korea must be carefully
structured to avoid or, at minimum, account for the likelihood that Pyongyang backs out
of the agreement. Given these concerns, along with the necessity of including strong
disarmament language within a prospective agreement, great attention must be paid to
how any nuclear deal with North Korea is drafted.
3. Structuring a North Korean Nuclear Agreement
In order for an agreement with North Korea to be effective, it must contain strong
disarmament provisions. However, in proposing potential provisions, it is important to be
mindful of reality. North Korea is unlikely to agree to a deal that binds it to complete
disarmament or is solely favorable to the United States. However, the United States will
want to make sure that any agreement reached is a treaty rather than a political
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agreement, as the latter is not sufficiently binding. 139 This section provides a nonexhaustive list of provisions that may be included in the preamble and operative portions
of a North Korean nuclear deal, explaining why each of these potential provisions are
both realistic and important. It also discusses other issues that might be wrapped into a
final agreement.
a. The Preamble
The preamble to a treaty ordinarily describes the contracting parties, their
objectives in executing the treaty, and any underlying events that prompted the treaty. In
formal negotiations, it is often advantageous to start with provisions that can be easily
agreed upon. Within the context of a nuclear deal with North Korea, many of these easily
agreed upon terms will likely be found in the preamble. Some provisions that might fall
within the preamble to an agreement are detailed below.
i. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, China, Russia,
Japan, South Korea and the United States (the “six parties”) have
decided upon this long-term normalization plan. The plan includes
the reciprocal commitments as provided in this document, and is to
be endorsed by the United Nations Security Council.
There are three key components to this provision. First, the description of the
agreement as a “normalization plan” rather than a nuclear disarmament agreement is
more likely to draw the support of both North Korea and the United States because it will
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allow leaders of both countries to declare a political victory at home. In the United States,
the political victory will be achieving some North Korean disarmament. In North Korea,
the Kim regime will need to describe the agreement as one in which they are not giving
up the entire nuclear program in order to maintain regime stability. The second key
component involves receiving support from the United Nations Security Council. This is
important because it effectively signals the UN’s blessing of the agreement. There is little
doubt that both countries will be able to agree on this provision. Third, the inclusion of all
parties from previous six-party talks makes a deal more likely, as there are both North
Korean allies and United States allies within the group. Given that nuclear talks with this
group have occurred in the past, it is likely that the parties would prefer negotiating
within this six party framework.
ii. The six parties agree to implement this plan in good faith in a
constructive atmosphere based on mutual respect and to refrain
from issuing verbal threats against each other based on the use of
nuclear weapons while this agreement is in place.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action included a similar “mutual respect”
provision, but it has done little to prevent Iran from issuing threats against the United
States. While these threats are unlikely to turn into concrete violence, they are still costly
to respond to. The inclusion of this provision will help assure that the same thing does not
happen with the North Korean nuclear deal. It will also hopefully allow the parties to
negotiate with each other without issuing nuclear threats if things do not work out later in
the negotiations. The United States will clearly agree to this provision, although it may be
difficult to get North Korea to do the same. The Kim regime uses its unpredictable
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foreign policy to assure security, and nuclear threats are a vital part of that policy. If the
parties can come to an agreement that internal propaganda detailing potential nuclear
attacks against the United States does not fall within this provision, North Korea may
agree. This would allow the Kim regime to maintain an erratic foreign policy not
centered on nuclear threats, and would assure that the regime has the ability to use these
threats to assure citizens’ loyalty.
iii. The six parties will meet each year in order to review and assess
progress and to adopt appropriate decisions by consensus.
This provision is designed to encourage the parties to remain engaged with each
other after an agreement is struck. Regular meetings will make it easier to discuss issues
related to implementation of the agreement. Regular engagement with North Korea may
also decrease tensions between them and the United States, although this is unlikely
given how crucial having the United States as an enemy has been to the Kim regime’s
grasp on power. Since provisions like this are common in nuclear agreements, it is
doubtful that any party will object to the inclusion of this provision. 140
b. Operative Provisions
The operative provisions of a treaty usually contain the substance of the parties’
actual agreement. These provisions will be more difficult for the involved parties to agree
upon. Provisions that might be included within the operative provisions are detailed
below.

140

See, e.g. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S.-Iran, art. xvi, Jul. 14, 2015.

Williams 28

i. North Korea reaffirms that under no circumstances will it ever
seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons. North Korea also
agrees to destroy one of its nuclear weapons each year until it has
no more than three nuclear weapons.
This provision is designed to achieve both a nuclear pause and affirmative
disarmament. A pause in North Korean nuclear activity is essential because of how
rapidly their nuclear program has been growing. Achieving a nuclear pause would help
stall this development, which would help every other member of this agreement because
it would diminish the number of nuclear tests and threats they have to respond to. This
would save a substantial amount of money. The proposed affirmative disarmament
provision will help diminish North Korea’s nuclear weapon count to levels in place at the
time of the Agreed Framework. 141 It will also make it more difficult for North Korea to
credibly threaten to use its weapons in a preemptive strike, as having such a minimal
number of weapons would diminish the country’s second-strike capability. If North
Korea were to use its limited number of weapons to launch a preemptive strike, it would
effectively be committing self-destruction. 142 Obviously, this will be among the most
hotly negotiated items within any treaty. However, given North Korea’s willingness to
sign disarmament agreements during the six party talks in exchange for energy aid and
sanctions relief, which is contained in a proposed provision discussed infra, it is possible
that they will agree to a similar provision here.
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ii. The full implementation of this plan will ensure the exclusively
peaceful nature of North Korea’s nuclear program. Successful
implementation of this plan will enable North Korea to fully enjoy
its rights to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the
relevant articles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
This provision is designed to mimic the agreement formed during the Fourth
Round of six-party talks. Allowing North Korea to use nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes accomplishes two things. First, in combination with the disarmament provision,
this will effectively make North Korea a partial member to the NPT. The NPT allows
members to use nuclear technology for exclusively peaceful purposes, which North
Korea would be doing with the exception of its already-developed nuclear weapons.
Second, allowing North Korea to develop nuclear technology for energy purposes has the
potential to increase the quality of life of those within North Korea. At present, North
Korea struggles to provide sufficient energy for its people. 143 This agreement would
effectively force North Korea to refocus its nuclear program on providing nuclear energy.
Given the extensive resources North Korea devotes to its nuclear program, 144 this will
probably enhance the country’s ability to provide electricity to its people. A similar
provision was agreed upon during the six party talks, so all parties should be willing to
agree to it. However, it should be noted that strong verification procedures, which are
discussed infra, would be necessary to get the United States to agree to this provision
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given concerns that North Korea could use its peaceful nuclear program to further its
non-peaceful nuclear goals.
iii. The full implementation of this plan will result in the United States
lifting sanctions against North Korea in proportion to the
percentage of its initial nuclear weapons stockpile that North
Korea has destroyed at that point in time. Once implementation is
complete, the United States will suspend all joint military exercises
with South Korea.
This provision represents a novel approach to implementing sanctions relief. Any
sanctions relief provision must be carefully structured to provide relief in proportion to
North Korea’s disarmament. In the JCPOA, the United States provided significant
frontloaded sanctions relief. 145 This approach provided a significant boost to Iran’s
economy in exchange for relatively minor nuclear weapon concessions. 146 However,
during early talks with Iran, the Obama administration proposed phased sanctions relief,
with sanctions to be lifted as Iran met agreed upon benchmarks. 147 Phased sanctions relief
was incorporated into the final agreement, although most of the relief occurred when Iran
met its first few benchmarks. 148 In a nuclear deal with North Korea, sanctions relief
should be more evenly distributed between different benchmarks. The United States
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should have no problem agreeing to this, but it will be more difficult to get North Korea’s
support. North Korea might require strong sanctions relief as a prerequisite to forming a
nuclear pause. Since sanctions have failed to curb North Korea’s nuclear program to date,
it appears that sanction relief alone is not sufficient to cripple North Korea’s nuclear
program, so the United States may be somewhat willing to provide significant sanctions
relief in exchange for North Korean nuclear concessions. 149 Despite this, sanctions relief
alone likely will not be enough to get North Korea to agree to a nuclear deal with the
United States. 150 Therefore, the included cessation of South Korea – United States joint
military exercises will be essential to reaching a final agreement. The United States may
agree to this provision if it views the final agreement as containing sufficient verification
procedures to prevent North Korean from nuclear cheating. This would make it easier for
South Korea to defend itself against threats from North Korea’s conventional forces,
which would potentially allow the United States to draw down some of its resources in
South Korea. A diminished presence in South Korea would be in the United States’ fiscal
interest and in the interests of North Korea, China, and Russia. So long as nuclear
cessation and disarmament provisions are strong enough, it is likely that the United States
will agree to this provision.
iv. North Korea will not share its nuclear weapons, any devices used
in association with those nuclear weapons, or information
regarding nuclear technology with any other country.
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It appears that North Korea has already shared ballistic missiles and related
technology with both Syria and Iran. 151 Pyongyang has also engaged in nuclear
cooperation with Syria. 152 A deal that prevents North Korea from assisting other
countries in their development of nuclear weapons programs would help prevent
widespread nuclear proliferation among countries that are hostile to the United States,
and is therefore extremely beneficial to American national security. However, it will be
difficult to get North Korea to agree to this provision because they may view sharing
their nuclear technology with other states as essential to helping those states protect their
sovereignty from the United States. Although this provision might not ultimately make it
into a final agreement, it would be useful for the United States and its allies to ask for it
as a means of testing North Korea’s willingness to refrain from providing its nuclear
technology to the Middle East.
v. In order to implement this plan, North Korea will allow a full and
complete inspection by IAEA inspectors. It will allow for two
regular annual inspections by the IAEA. If North Korea prevents
inspections, the most recent round of sanctions relief will be reimplemented.
This represents the verification portion of a potential agreement. Given North
Korea’s perceived cheating in the past, it is likely that the United States, South Korea,
and Japan will desire and require strong verification procedures in order to strike a
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nuclear deal with North Korea. North Korea has agreed to similar verification procedures
in the past, although they have also blocked IAEA inspections of certain facilities and
evaded verification procedures. As a result, those concerned about North Korean
verification should make sure to clarify that the “full and complete” provision allows for
inspections of any and all nuclear facilities. The inclusion of a penalty in the case of
blocked inspections will also help prevent verification violations. North Korea has agreed
to similar verification provisions in the past, so it is possible that they will do so again,
although the inclusion of sanctions penalties may make obtaining their approval for this
provision more difficult. Since these verification procedures are stricter than those
contained in previous six party agreements, and since the United States likely recognizes
the necessity of strong verification procedures, it is likely that they will agree to this
provision.
c. Other Subjects That Might Be Included in the Final Agreement
Although not necessarily germane to nuclear disarmament, a number of other
issues might be included in a prospective agreement with North Korea. Two potential
topics stand out: (1) North Korean human rights abuses and (2) economic reforms.
Human rights in North Korea are extremely limited. In practice, North Koreans
have no right to free speech and only have access to radio, television, music, and news
providers that are owned and operated by the government. 153 As mentioned supra, North
Korea strictly punishes those who speak out against the government by reeducating,
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imprisoning, or executing the violator as well as the violator’s family. 154 The United
Nation’s Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea also found human rights abuses related to the right to food, the right to life, the
right to freedom of movement, religious persecution, torture and inhumane treatment,
sexual violence and human trafficking, enforced disappearances (including abductions of
nationals from other countries), and arbitrary detention. 155 The Kim regime uses many of
these abuses to stay in power. 156 Even if someone manages to defect from North Korea,
they often suffer the same human rights abuses. 157 Most North Korean defectors defect to
China, which does not recognize them as refugees but rather refers to them as “economic
migrants.” 158 As a result, most of them do not receive protection under Chinese law,
which often results in them being taken advantage of in the border region China shares
with North Korea. 159 Given the United States’ and United Nations’ interest in reducing
human rights abuses in North Korea, it is possible that they would attempt to include
language that would make certain human rights abuses violations of a prospective nuclear
deal. Unfortunately, this is an unrealistic idea because many of the human rights abuses
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are likely to continue regardless of any nuclear deal. 160 Any provision that strongly
restricts against these abuses would probably result in the nuclear deal being violated,
rendering the entire exercise of negotiating one pointless. Further, China and North Korea
are extremely unlikely to agree to curtail these abuses because they are critical to helping
the Kim regime maintain its power. 161 Given this reality, the United States and others
should pursue an alternative strategy to get North Korea to end its human rights abuses,
and should not attempt to weave this issue into nuclear negotiations. 162
Including economic reforms in a nuclear disarmament treaty would make more
sense. North Korea has already made some market-oriented economic reforms. 163 As a
result of not enforcing its laws against private entrepreneurship, analysts believe the
North Korean economy has grown between 1.5% and 4% annually over the last decade
and now includes private mines, truck companies, and oil refineries. 164 Although owners
have to register the enterprise as state property, they are treated for all intents and
purposes as private companies. 165 Although private entrepreneurship was initially solely
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available to the rich, it has now started to become accessible to middle and lower class
people, which has improved their quality of life. 166 Agriculture reforms have been
particularly successful. Like Chinese agricultural reforms in the 1970s, North Korea
maintains fields as state owned but gives them to individual households, who work for
between 30% and 70% of the harvest. 167 This has resulted in larger harvests and
decreased food shortages. 168 These economic gains may help further entrench the Kim
regime, as a stronger internal North Korean economy will mean that the existing North
Korean government is less likely to collapse due to internal pressure. Economic growth
also makes North Korea more immune to sanctions and less willing to agree to a nuclear
deal solely based on sanctions relief. The United States and others may encourage North
Korea to open their economy for foreign direct investment as part of a potential nuclear
deal. In one sense, this is similar to what the United States has recently done with Cuba.
Given the potential economic benefit and increased tax revenue that might flow into the
country as a result of foreign investment, North Korea may be willing to agree to allow
such a provision to be included in a nuclear deal. This type of provision would also make
it easier for North Korea to export their natural resources, which would further benefit
their economy. On the other hand, North Korea might view opening their economy as an
attempt to advance capitalism and an infringement on their sovereignty. 169 The United
States and others would most likely want any provision that opens up North Korea’s
economy to include measures designed to prevent the seizure of foreigners’ property.
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Given the Kim regime’s various human rights abuses, it is unlikely that North Korea
would agree to or abide by such a provision. As a result, it is unlikely that significant
amounts of foreign investment would flow into the country. However, merely opening up
North Korea’s economy and encouraging imports and exports has the potential to
improve the quality of life for North Koreans while also allowing them more access to
Western ideas and goods. Ideally, this would make the North Korean people more
amenable and less hostile to the West, an important philosophical benefit that has the
potential to normalize relations over the long term.
4. Strategic Benefits of a North Korean Nuclear Deal
A nuclear deal with North Korea would provide many strategic benefits to the
United States. While those benefits largely hinge on the contents of the hypothetical
agreement, the analysis below focuses primarily on an agreement that contains the
provisions recommended supra.
a. Regional Nuclear Proliferation and Political Impact
A North Korean nuclear deal would be a major step toward Asian regional
nuclear non-proliferation. Asia contains two of the United States’ strongest and most well
established allies in South Korea and Japan. 170 At the same time, Asia already contains
two states with well-developed nuclear arsenals in China and Russia. 171 Both of these
states are NPT nuclear-weapons states. 172 China has approximately 260 total warheads
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while Russia has 1582 deployed warheads on 515 ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic
bombers. 173 In addition to China and Russia, India and Pakistan also have nuclear
weapons. 174 Neither of these countries has joined the NPT. 175 India’s nuclear program
started for peaceful purposes, with the country testing its first nuclear weapon in 1974. 176
As a result of that test, Pakistan developed a secret nuclear weapons program. 177 This
resulted in a small nuclear arms race between both countries. 178 Today, India possesses
between 90 and 110 nuclear warheads while Pakistan has roughly 100 to 120
warheads. 179 All of these arsenals are far larger than North Korea’s current arsenal, 180 so
in theory each of these countries has the means of deterring a North Korean nuclear
threat. However, given North Korea’s erratic behavior and unpredictability, it is difficult
to use traditional means of deterrence. Even if the Kim regime is rational enough not to
use its nuclear weapons in a preemptive strike within the region, its unpredictability
coupled with its bellicose language might lead some within the region to solidify their
nuclear capabilities or develop strong conventional forces as a means of assuring regional
stability.
A nuclear deal would help assure regional stability and would diminish military
buildup within the region. As a result, it is likely that these countries will not feel

173

Id. In total, Russia has more nuclear warheads than any other country. Id.

174

Id.

175

Id.

176

Id.

177

Id.

178

See id.

179

Id.

180

See id.

Williams 39

compelled to greatly enlarge their nuclear weapon count even if a deal with North Korea
allows Pyongyang to keep some nuclear weapons or continue uranium enrichment. The
remaining non-nuclear states within the region, South Korea and Japan, are two of the
United States’ strongest allies and rely on it for defense. A nuclear deal struck between
the United States and North Korea would help ensure that these countries do not attempt
to develop their own nuclear programs as a means of potentially enhancing their
deterrence capability and therefore regional security. Of course, a potential nuclear deal
may call for the United States to reduce its presence in South Korea or perhaps Asia as a
whole. If this is the case, it will be vitally important to South Korea and Japan that strong
verification procedures are established. Further, even if the United States’ removes forces
from these countries, it will likely still be able to provide them with missile defense
systems as a means of deterring any remaining North Korean nuclear threat. 181 A nuclear
deal would benefit China and Russia specifically by putting each country in a better
position to preserve their power in the region. For instance, a strong nuclear disarmament
deal with North Korea that contains sufficient verification provisions might result in the
United States diminishing its presence in Asia. This would strengthen China’s regional
power. It would also likely benefit Russia, one of North Korea’s few remaining allies, as
the country has been critical of the United States’ presence in South Korea. 182 Likewise,
Russia has pointed out that North Korea’s repeated threats of using nuclear weapons for a
preventative strike give Pyongyang’s opponents just cause to pursue military action
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against it. 183 This would be a particularly troublesome prospect for Russia, which would
potentially lose a relatively strong regional ally. A nuclear deal would help solidify the
power of Russia and China in the region because it might put an end to North Korea’s
repeated nuclear threats and would likely result in some withdrawal of American troops
from the region. As a result, it is likely that these states will refrain from developing
weapons of their own as the result of a North Korean nuclear deal.
A North Korean nuclear deal might also help aid political stability in the Middle
East. Syria has received ballistic missiles and related technology from North Korea, and
both countries have engaged in nuclear technology cooperation. 184 A North Korean deal
that restricts the country’s ability to share nuclear weapons technology and support with
other regimes will make it more difficult for rogue regimes in the Middle East to develop
nuclear weapons, which will aid in Middle Eastern nuclear stability. Therefore, the
benefits of a North Korean nuclear deal would extend far beyond Asia to the Middle East.
Increased stability in these regions would benefit the United States.
b. Diminished Threat to the United States
North Korea has tested nuclear weapons on three separate occasions. 185 Its
weapons program appears to be rapidly developing, as Pyongyang has developed
primitive SLBM capability and has ramped up its nuclear testing. 186 A North Korean
nuclear deal would at worst help slow down this development and at best help stop it in
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its tracks. Given the rapid rate of North Korean nuclear development, the United States’
role in Asia, and its associated obligation to respond to tests and threats on behalf of its
allies in the region, a nuclear deal would greatly enhance the security of the United States
and would reduce resource drain.
North Korea may have the ability to reach the continental United States with its
nuclear weapons. 187 Even if it lacks ICBM capability at present, it appears poised to build
one in the near future. 188 North Korea has been rapidly developing its nuclear weapons
and delivery devices, which has led analysts to believe that they are aiming to increase
the range of their weapons to the point that they could reach the entire continental United
States. 189 At present, the program can reach the Northeastern, Mid Atlantic, South, and
Southeastern portions of the United States, including cities like Washington, DC and
New York, NY. 190 While any nuclear attack against the United States would be
devastating, an East Coast attack would be potentially more problematic because the area
is more populous than the West Coast and contains centers of American government and
finance. 191 As a result, a deal that leads to a North Korean nuclear pause would make
important strides toward diminishing the potential nuclear threat to the United States. A
nuclear pause that also requires North Korea to halt development of miniaturization
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capabilities and nuclear warhead delivery missiles would be vitally important to
diminishing North Korea’s ability to use a nuclear weapon against the United States.
c. Economic Impact of Lifting Sanctions
North Korea has the world’s worst economy as a result of economic sanctions and
the Kim regime’s own mismanagement. 192 For instance, North Korea’s per capita imports
in 2015 were three-fifths of what they were in 1974. 193 The country’s 2015 exports were
the same as those in the mid-1970s. 194 Although recent reforms have helped the domestic
economy grow, it still pales in comparison to many of the least developed countries. 195
As discussed supra, the Obama Administration placed strong economic sanctions on
North Korea and third parties assisting in North Korea’s human rights violations through
Executive Order 13722. The UNSC has also placed significant sanctions on North Korea
in response to its testing of nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles. 196 Regardless of
international sanctions, the country has the worst business climate of any fully
functioning nation state. 197 While the Kim regime remains deeply committed to its
nuclear weapons program, it is also starting to face the reality that it must improve its
economy if it is to remain in power. 198 This is likely part of the motivation behind recent
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economic reforms in the country. 199 Even though the Kim regime has historically been
opposed to reform of any kind, there appear to have been efforts in recent years to
modernize North Korean agriculture and allow private enterprise. 200 These efforts have
been partially modeled on Chinese economic reforms that relied on foreign expertise and
access to global capital markets. 201 While these reforms have helped North Korea’s
economy, 202 significant economic improvement will most likely only be possible if the
Kim regime is willing to engage with the outside world. Pyongyang remains skeptical of
foreign direct investment, but that it has embraced economic advancement signals its
potential willingness to eventually engage with the global economy. 203 For instance,
North Korea has agreed with China, its strongest trading ally, to construct a third bridge
linking the two countries and allowing for expanded trade. 204 At present, North Korea
only has decent economic relationships with China and Russia. While both countries are
major economic powers, their economies have struggled as of late. Chinese companies
have also become wary of North Korea’s inhospitable business environment. 205 As a
result, if North Korea wants to grow its economic security, it will likely have to open its
economy to some foreign investment. Sanctions relief will help North Korea accomplish
this.
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Since most sanctions are based on Pyongyang’s nuclear program, that program
will most likely have to be the primary negotiating chip in order to remove or pause
sanctions. 206 Given that sanctions have done little to convince North Korea to restrict its
nuclear activities, it appears that a nuclear deal with North Korea will have to be based on
more than sanctions relief alone. 207 It is likely that the United States will have to also
include provisions designed to curtail joint military exercises with South Korea and
potentially reduce its military presence in Asia. Even so, for a deal to be successful, it
will have to incentivize North Korea to comply with its provisions. Pegging sanctions
relief to disarmament is one way to accomplish this. As North Korea disarms itself
further, more and more sanctions will be eliminated. In other words, an agreement
structured like this will make it so that nuclear disarmament helps North Korea grow its
economy, resulting in potentially greater political stability for the Kim regime.
Sanctions relief will have many benefits for each of the six countries likely to be
included in any prospective nuclear agreement. First, sanctions relief will allow third
parties within each of the countries to trade with North Korea with little fear that the
United States will subject them to harsh sanctions. It should be noted, however, that the
United States would probably maintain the ability to bring sanctions against third parties
who assist North Korea with its human rights abuses. Either way, this will provide a
significant boost to international commerce. Second, if the agreement calls for the
opening of North Korea’s economy, it will allow some or all of the countries to export to
and receive imports from North Korea. In reality, a provision in which North Korea
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allows for all foreign investment is unlikely to be a part of any agreement. However, it is
possible that a provision allowing some limited and pre-screened foreign investment may
be included. It is unlikely that entities from certain countries, especially the United States,
would really want to invest directly in North Korea. However, merely opening up the
possibility of trade between these countries may expose North Koreans to some Western
culture or media and will make the North Korean economy more likely to expand.
Exposing North Koreans to Western culture may also make them less hostile to the
United States, as happened when China began trading on a global scale. 208 Third, if the
North Korean economy grows as the result of increased trade and foreign investment,
some of that growth will likely flow to its citizens. 209 The effect of this is uncertain. In
combination with increased access to Western goods and media, this might result in
greater cross-cultural understanding. On the other hand, the Kim regime may well
prevent Western media and goods from reaching its citizens, fearing that this would
decrease the regime’s ability to maintain power in the country. Either way, enhanced
prosperity of the North Korean people may lead to fewer human rights violations, which
will allow the United States to diminish its military presence in South Korea and decrease
the amount of humanitarian support it provides to North Korea. All of this will save the
United States substantial amounts of money.
d. Informational and Communicational Benefits
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Uncertainty is the name of the game when it comes to North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program. Since there is no international oversight of Pyongyang’s nuclear
program and no real intelligence on the threat it poses within the region, it is difficult to
accurately assess North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. 210 And while North Korea is known
to exaggerate these capabilities, there is also no guarantee that the rogue regime does not
pose a clear nuclear threat to the United States despite any language to the contrary. 211
Any nuclear deal with North Korea that would enable the United States and the global
intelligence community to get a better handle on North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and
ambitions would be an important advancement to international security.
Verification procedures are essential to gathering intelligence related to North
Korea’s nuclear program. These procedures will help provide a better idea of whether
they are capable of striking the continental United States, as the intelligence community,
outside commentators, and international agencies seem to have come to different
conclusions about whether this is possible. 212
Even if verification procedures reveal that North Korea does not pose an
immediate threat to the United States, a nuclear deal may curtail North Korea’s harsh
threats. North Korea has released propaganda videos depicting nuclear attacks against the
United States and Seoul, South Korea. 213 Likewise, it has threatened to turn Seoul into “a
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sea of fire” and to launch a “merciless sacred war” against South Korean media
groups. 214 Rhetoric such as this, even if it is empty and not indicative of an actual threat,
causes severe security anxiety and diverts national security resources. 215 If North Korea
were to strike a nuclear deal with the United States, it would be difficult for them to
continue to successfully use propaganda rhetoric claiming that it is prepared to attack the
United States. The JCPOA has been moderately successful in accomplishing this,
although the agreement has been primarily used by Iranian politicians as signifying that
Iran “went into a war with the six great powers of the world and was…successful.” 216
The United States would probably prefer this type of rhetoric from North Korea to its
perpetual nuclear threats. Further, a provision barring specific threats of preemptive
nuclear strikes could potentially be included in a nuclear agreement. A provision like this
will help keep the implementation of a nuclear agreement on track and will play a role in
assuring that the agreement does not fall apart after it is implemented.
5. A Nuclear Deal for the Long-Haul
To maximize the benefits of a nuclear deal, the United States and other parties
will have to find a way to keep the deal in place over a long period of time. Promising
agreements have been negotiated with North Korea in the past only to dissolve upon
allegations of North Korean cheating or sovereignty infringements by the United States.
Strong verification measures alone cannot fully prevent this from happening again. A
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combination of hard power, continued diplomacy, and economic penalties for cheating
will be necessary to assure that a nuclear agreement remains in place over the long haul.
Hard power will not require substantial military action. The United States should
provide South Korea and Japan with defensive systems and leave some troops near Seoul
in order to counterbalance North Korea’s large conventional military. For their part,
South Korea and Japan should both increase their military power enough to dissuade
North Korea from attempting to use its conventional military forces. These actions will
discourage North Korea from rapidly revamping its nuclear program as a means of
threatening the United States’ Asian allies.
A provision requiring continued diplomatic engagement should be a part of any
North Korean nuclear agreement. While routine engagement with North Korea cannot
prevent it from cheating on an agreement, it will play a significant role in developing a
cooperative relationship between all parties. Continued diplomacy will make it easier to
tell if diplomatic relationships have soured or remain strong, and may help encourage
further dialogue between the parties regarding North Korea’s human rights abuses.
Economic penalties for cheating should also be a part of a North Korean nuclear
deal. While these provisions may not prevent all cheating, they will give North Korea
greater incentive to avoid cheating than an agreement that merely terminates when it is
violated. Further, if an agreement contains both economic aid or development provisions
and strong verification provisions that make cheating difficult, it will make North Korea
less likely to cheat and violate the agreement. If the potential detriment of cheating is
strong economic penalties and the potential benefit is minimal nuclear development, it
would be difficult for North Korea to justify continuing a nuclear program in secret.
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Together, all of these protections should help keep a nuclear agreement in place for
significantly longer than past agreements. Developing a stable treaty that stands the test
of time would be the best possible outcome for national and international security.
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